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  Eventi di oggi 22 ottobre 2018

  • ott 22 lun 2018

    Seminar
    Shmuel Zamir, Strategic use of seller information in private-value first-price auctions,  22-10-2018, ore 11:00
    logo matematica
    • Seminar
    • Shmuel Zamir
    • The Hebrew University
    • Strategic use of seller information in private-value first-price auctions
    • Lunedì 22 ottobre 2018 alle ore 11:00
    • Politecnico di Milano, Dipartimento di Matematica, Sala del Consiglio 7° piano
    • Abstract
      In the framework of a private-value-first-price auction, we consider the seller as a player in a game with the buyers in which he has private information about their realized valuations. We ask whether the seller can benefit by using his private information strategically. We find that in fact, depending upon his information, set of signals, and commitment power the seller may indeed increase his revenue by strategic transmission of his information. For example, in the case of two buyers with values distributed independently and uniformly on [0,1], a seller informed of the private values of the buyers, can achieve a revenue close to 1/2 by sending verifiable messages (compared to 1/3 in the standard auction), and this is the largest revenue that can be obtained with any signalling strategy.
    • Politecnico di Milano, Dipartimento di Matematica via Bonardi 9, 20133 Milano – Telefono: +39 02 2399 4505 – Fax: +39 02 2399 4568

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