Probability, Agnosticism, and Guarantees in Inductive Learning Processes


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(joint work with Simone Garatti and Algo carè)



Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense - 2019



"our" classroom at the Politecnico

Probability, Agnosticism, and Guarantees in Inductive Learning Processes




R nominal value 2G Ohm standard deviation = 0.1G Ohm

$$Y = R + N$$

- construct bi-variate distribution for (R,Y) ----- use Bayes rule

a misconception

 subjectivism goes hand in hand with fully probabilistic models (and Bayesian updating)



$$p = \frac{m}{50}, \quad m \in \{0, \dots, 50\}$$

<u>agnosticism</u>

Every probability distribution is possible

practical reasons

philosophical reasons

<u>agnosticism</u>

Every probability distribution is possible

---> practical reasons



goal: predict whether the defibrillator shock will be effective

<u>agnosticism</u>


Every probability distribution is possible


practical reasons


philosophical reasons


can knowledge be created out of lack of knowledge in the light of observations? is it possible to derive mathematically rigorous and practically useful data-driven techniques within an agnostic setup?


convex hull













7 points at the boundary



7 points at the boundary


988 points at the boundary

complexity



"7 points at the boundary" \implies "if only these 7 points are maintained, "Opt" gives the same solution"

complexity



"7 points at the boundary" \implies "if only these 7 points are maintained, "Opt" gives the same solution"

complexity of representation

intuitively: high complexity \implies high risk


Theorem (with S. Garatti)


$$Pr\{\mathsf{risk} \le \epsilon(\mathsf{complexity})\} \ge 1 - \beta$$


where


$$\begin{split} \beta &= \inf_{\xi(\cdot) \in \mathsf{P}_N} \quad \xi(1) \\ \text{subject to:} \quad & \frac{1}{k!} \frac{d^k}{dt^k} \xi(t) \geq {N \choose k} t^{N-k} \cdot \mathbf{1}\{t \in [0, 1-\epsilon(k))\} \quad t \in [0, 1], \\ & k = 0, 1, \dots, N. \end{split}$$

[M.C. Campi, S. Garatti, Mathematical Programming, 2016]









<u>suppose</u>: no concentrated mass

Theorem (with S. Garatti)


$$Pr\{\underline{\epsilon}(\mathsf{complexity}) \leq \mathsf{risk} \leq \overline{\epsilon}(\mathsf{complexity})\}$$

 $\geq 1 - \beta$

where, with the position $t=1-\epsilon$, $\underline{\epsilon}$ and $\overline{\epsilon}$ are given by:

$${\binom{N}{k}}t^{N-k} - \frac{\beta}{2N} \sum_{i=k}^{N-1} {i \choose k} t^{i-k} - \frac{\beta}{6N} \sum_{i=N+1}^{4N} {i \choose k} t^{i-k} = 0.$$


[S. Garatti, M.C. Campi, Mathematical Programming, 2019]




how general is all this?

consistent decision-making

- δ = observation
- \mathcal{D} = set of decisions
- each δ has associated a subset $\mathcal{D}_{\delta} \subseteq \mathcal{D}$, the set of decisions that are appropriate for δ
- (a) **permutation invariance**: $P(\delta_1, \delta_2, \dots, \delta_n) = P(\delta_{i_1}, \delta_{i_2}, \dots, \delta_{i_n});$
- (b) **stability in the case of confirmation**: if $P(\delta_1, \delta_2, ..., \delta_n)$ is appropriate for m new observations $\delta_{n+1}, ..., \delta_{n+m}$, then $P(\delta_1, \delta_2, ..., \delta_n, \delta_{n+1}, ..., \delta_{n+m}) = P(\delta_1, \delta_2, ..., \delta_n)$;
- (c) **responsiveness to contradiction**: if there is at least one observation δ_{n+i} for which $P(\delta_1, \delta_2, \dots, \delta_n)$ is not appropriate, then $P(\delta_1, \delta_2, \dots, \delta_n, \delta_{n+1}, \dots, \delta_{n+m}) \neq P(\delta_1, \delta_2, \dots, \delta_n)$.






robust optimization

$$\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}} c(x)$$

 $\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}} c(x)$ subject to: $x \in \mathcal{X}_{\delta_i}, i = 1, \dots, N$

for example: Robust Control



$$\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}} c(x)$$
 subject to: $x \in \mathcal{X}_{\delta_i}, \quad i = 1, \dots, N$

$$\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}} c(x)$$

subject to: $f(x, \delta_i) \leq 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, N$

$$\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}, \xi_i \ge 0} c(x) + \rho \sum_{i=1}^{N} \xi_i$$


subject to: $f(x, \delta_i) \le \xi_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N$

$$\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}, \xi_i \ge 0} \quad c(x) + \rho \sum_{i=1}^{N} \xi_i$$

subject to: $f(x, \delta_i) \leq \xi_i$, i = 1, ..., N

for example, SVM:

$$\min_{w \in \mathbb{R}^d, b \in \mathbb{R}, \xi_i \ge 0} ||w||^2 + \rho \sum_{i=1}^N \xi_i$$
subject to: $1 - y_i(\langle w, u_i \rangle - b) \le \xi_i$



more ...

- constraint discarding

- CVaR = Conditional Value at Risk

. . .

beyond Popper

- complexity is an impartial judge of reliability and
- inductive procedures with continuous updates to observations are valid if complexity acts as a referee to assess model risk. (*)

(*) In "Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge", Karl Popper explicitly condemns the practice of adapting theories to observations. Speaking of the Marxist theory of history, he writes that its followers ``reinterpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make them agree. [...] They thus gave a `conventionalist twist' to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim of scientific status"



Happy birthday, Marco!

Please, send me comments/remarks/observations: marco.campi@unibs.it

A **monograph** that links philosophical aspects to mathematical results can be downloaded from here:

https://marco-campi.unibs.it/pdf-pszip/inductive%20methods.pdf

The monograph is not yet published. I would greatly appreciate receiving your comments, even on partial aspects of the work. Thank you!